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Abstract
A coalition is blameable for an outcome if the
coalition had a strategy to prevent it. It has been
previously suggested that the cost of prevention,
or the cost of sacrifice, can be used to measure
the degree of blameworthiness. The paper adopts
this approach and proposes a modal logical system
for reasoning about the degree of blameworthiness.
The main technical result is a completeness theo-
rem for the proposed system.
1 Introduction
On October 13th, 2011, a two-year-old girl was run over
by a van in the city of Foshan in Guangdong Province,
China. 18 people passed by and ignored her before a
stranger moved the girl to the side of the road and notified
her mom [周松 et al., 2011; Bristow, 2011]. The girl, nick-
named “Little Yueyue” by Chinese media, later died in hos-
pital [BBC, 2017]. This tragic incident is not unique. On
April 21, 2017, a woman was crossing a street in the city
of Zhumadian in the Chinese Province of Henan. She was
struck by a taxi and laid on the road until an SUV run over
her, neither drivers nor pedestrian stopped to help her. She
later died from injuries [熊浩然, 2017; Johnson, 2017]. Al-
though many Chinese were outraged by these events and
blamed the passers-by for not helping, others did not. Try-
ing to understand the people who does not blame passers-
by, the New York Times quotes a post on Weibo, a Chi-
nese social network: “If I helped her to get up and sent her
to the hospital, doctors would ask you to pay the medical
bill. Her relatives would come and beat you up indiscrimi-
nately.” [Johnson, 2017]. This explanation refers to an even
earlier event. On November 20, 2006, in the city of Nanjing,
Jiangsu Province, an old woman fell down on a bus stop. A
young man helped her to get up, escorted her to a hospital,
and stayed there until she was examined by a doctor. He was
later sued by the woman and her relatives. The court eventu-
ally ordered him to pay 40 percent of the medical costs. The
verdict said that “according to common sense” it is highly
likely that the man is responsible for the woman’s fall be-
cause otherwise he “would have left soon after sending the
woman to the hospital instead of staying there for the surgical
check” [Shinan, 2011]. New York Times cites Dali L. Yang,
a political scientist at the University of Chicago, saying “In
the aftermath of the Nanjing case, many Chinese worry about
the victims turning around to blame the helpers, and thus feel
unable to offer direct help.” [Johnson, 2017].
The cited above post on Weibo essentially says that the
people should not be blamed for not doing something that
would require them to sacrifice a lot. A similar position is
argued by Shelly Kagan in his book The Limits of Moral-
ity, where he suggests that sacrifice could be one of possible
ways to measure the degree of moral blameworthiness: the
higher sacrifice is required to prevent something the less a
person (or a group of people) should be blamed for not do-
ing it [Kagan, 1991]. Nelkin argues that the sacrifice can
be used as a degree of blameworthiness and praiseworthi-
ness [2016]. [Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner, 2018] suggested
to measure sacrifice by its cost. They also noted that there
are other ways to define degree of blameworthiness; for ex-
ample, through probability with which the harm could have
been prevented.
The dilemma of balancing costs and moral responsibili-
ties is being faced not only by passers-by in China. Insur-
ance companies need to choose between refusing to pay for
very expensive drug and potentially saving life of a patient.
Car engineers choose between better safety equipment and
its higher cost. Governments have to balance public support
of life-saving medical research with its cost.
In this paper we propose a sound and complete logical
system that describes modality BsCϕ meaning “coalition
C is blameable for ϕ with degree s”, where the degree
is defined as the cost of the sacrifice the coalition would
have made to prevent ϕ. Our work heavily builds on
[Alechina et al., 2011] logic for resource bounded coalitions
and [Naumov and Tao, 2019] logic of blameworthiness
in strategic games. In turn, both of these papers rooted
in widely studied [van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2005;
Borgo, 2007; Sauro et al., 2006; A˚gotnes et al., 2010;
A˚gotnes et al., 2009; Belardinelli, 2014;
Goranko et al., 2013; Goranko and Enqvist, 2018] Marc
Pauly’s logic of coalition power [Pauly, 2002]. Pauly
gave a complete axiomatization of modality SCϕ that
stands for “coalition C has a strategy to achieve ϕ”.
[Alechina et al., 2011] did the same for modality SrCϕ
meaning “coalition C has a strategy to achieve ϕ using
resources r”. [Naumov and Tao, 2019] proposed a complete
axiomatization of modality BCϕ, “coalition C is blam-
able for outcome ϕ”. They used a common approach of
defining blamable as “statement ϕ is true but coalition C
had a strategy to prevent it”. This approach is known as
the principle of alternative possibilities [Frankfurt, 1969;
Widerker, 2017] or counterfactual [Cushman, 2015] defini-
tion of blameworthiness. It is also a part of Halpern-Pearl
formal definition of causality as a relation between sets
of variables [Halpern, 2016]. Counterfactuals could
also be used to define regret and several other emo-
tions [Lorini and Schwarzentruber, 2011]. Although the
principle of alternative possibilities is the most common way
to define blameworthiness, other approaches has been ex-
plored too. [Xu, 1998] introduced a complete axiomatization
of a modal logical system for reasoning about responsibility
defined as taking actions that guarantee a certain outcome.
[Broersen et al., 2009] extended Xu’s work from individual
responsibility to group responsibility.
In this paper we propose a logic of blameworthiness with
sacrifice that describes universal property of modality BsC ,
meaning “statement ϕ is true but coalitionC had a strategy to
prevent it at cost no more than s”. Our main technical results
are the soundness and the completeness theorems for this log-
ical system.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
define the formal syntax and semantics of our logical system.
In Section 3 we list and discuss its axioms. In Section 4 and
Section 5 we prove, respectively, the soundness and the com-
pleteness of our system. Section 6 concludes.
2 Syntax and Semantics
In this paper we assume a fixed set A of agents and a fixed
set of propositional variables Prop. By a coalition we mean
an arbitrary subset of set A.
Definition 1 Φ is the minimal set of formulae such that
1. p ∈ Φ for each variable p ∈ Prop,
2. ϕ→ ψ,¬ϕ ∈ Φ for all formulae ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ,
3. Nϕ, BsCϕ ∈ Φ for each coalition C ⊆ A, each real
number s ≥ 0, and each formula ϕ ∈ Φ.
In other words, language Φ is defined by grammar:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | Nϕ | BsCϕ.
Informally, modality BsCϕ means “coalition C is blameable
for statement ϕ with degree s”. The other modality in our
system is Nϕ, which stands for “statement ϕ is universally
true in the given game”. By Nϕ we mean formula ¬N¬ϕ.
We assume that conjunction ∧ and disjunction ∨ are defined
in the standard way.
By XY we mean the set of all functions from set Y toX .
Definition 2 A game is a tuple (∆, ‖ · ‖, d0,Ω, P, pi), where
1. ∆ is a nonempty set of “actions”,
2. Ω is a set of “outcomes”,
3. ‖d‖ is a non-negative real number for each d ∈ ∆,
called the cost of action d,
4. d0 ∈ ∆ is a zero-cost action: ‖d0‖ = 0,
5. a set of “plays” P is an arbitrary set of pairs (δ, ω) such
that ω ∈ Ω is an outcome and δ ∈ ∆A is a function from
set A to set ∆, called “complete action profile”,
6. pi is a function that maps Prop into subsets of P .
For example, in the case of Little Yueyue from the introduc-
tion, each of the passers-by had two available actions: to help
or to ignore. Thus, ∆ = {help, ignore}. For the purpose
of this example, we assume that any passer-by volunteering
to help, would have to pay U1000 towards Little Yueyue’s
medical bill: ‖help‖ = 1000. We also assume that ignor-
ing is a zero-cost option: ‖ignore‖ = 0. There are two
possible outcomes: either Yueyue stays alive or dies. Thus,
Ω = {alive, dead}. The set of plays P describes all possi-
ble combinations of actions and outcomes in the game. In
our case, these combinations are listed as separate lines of
the table in Figure 1. Although there have been 19 passers-by
mentioned in Little Yueyue tragic story (18 of who decided
to ignore and one who decided to help), to keep our exam-
ple simple, we assume that there were only three agents: a1,
a2, and a3. If any of the first two of them decided to help,
Little Yueyue would be alive. We assume that the third agent
arrived too late to save her life, see Figure 1.
δ(a1) δ(a2) δ(a3) ω
ignore ignore ignore dead
ignore ignore help dead
ignore help ignore alive
ignore help help alive
help ignore ignore alive
help ignore help alive
help help ignore alive
help help help alive
Figure 1: Set of plays P .
Note that pi maps propositional variables not into set of out-
comes, but into sets of plays. This is because we allow state-
ments represented by atomic propositions to refer not only
to outcome, but to actions as well. An example of such state-
ment in our case is “if agent a2 helps, then Little Yueyue stays
alive”.
One can imagine a fixed “tax” added to costs of all ac-
tions in the game. Such uniform tax constitutes fixed over-
head costs and should not be used to measure the sacrifice.
To avoid this situation in Definition 4 we assume existence
of zero-cost action d0. This assumption is significant because
without it theMonotonicity axiom of our system would not be
valid. A similar assumption is made in the logic for resource
bounded coalitions [Alechina et al., 2011].
Definition 3 For any action profile γ ∈ ∆C of a coalition
C by ‖γ‖ we mean the total cost of the action profile to the
coalition: ‖γ‖ =
∑
a∈C ‖a‖.
For any functions f and g, we write f =X g, if f(x) = g(x)
for each x ∈ X .
Definition 4 For any formula ϕ and any play (δ, ω) ∈ P
of a game (∆, ‖ · ‖, d0,Ω, P, pi), the satisfiability relation
(δ, ω)  ϕ is defined recursively as follows:
1. (δ, ω)  p if (δ, ω) ∈ pi(p), where p ∈ Prop,
2. (δ, ω)  ¬ϕ if (δ, ω) 1 ϕ,
3. (δ, ω)  ϕ→ ψ if (δ, ω) 1 ϕ or (δ, ω)  ψ,
4. (δ, ω)  Nϕ if (δ′, ω′)  ϕ for each play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P ,
5. (δ, ω)  BsCϕ if (δ, ω)  ϕ and there is γ ∈ ∆
C such
that ‖γ‖ ≤ s and for each play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P , if γ =C δ
′,
then (δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ.
Note that item 5 of Definition 4 takes into account poten-
tial costs under action profile δ′ =C γ to coalition C and
ignores the actual costs under the action profile δ. We refer
to this way of defining the sacrifice as the absolute sacrifice.
Alternatively, by the relative sacrifice we mean the difference
between the costs under these two profiles or how much more
it would cost the coalition to prevent undesired outcome com-
paring to the current costs.
The use of the absolute sacrifice as a degree of blamewor-
thiness makes sense in many situations. For example, let us
assume that in the Little Yueyue example agent a1 was head-
ing to a medical supply store to buy a new U1000 wheelchair
for his ill child. The agent is now facing a moral choice
between (a) zero-cost option of doing nothing, (b) spend-
ing U1000 on a new wheelchair, and (c) spending U1000
on a medical bill. If the agent were to choose to help in-
stead of buying the wheelchair, his relative sacrifice would
be zero. In this case, the absolute sacrifice of U1000 is
probably a better measure of the degree of blameworthiness.
At the same time, relative sacrifice makes sense in situation
like blame for the result of corner-cutting in safety, when
a small additional expense could prevent a tragic incident.
[Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner, 2018] use relative sacrifice as
their measure of degree of blameworthiness.
3 Axioms
In addition to the propositional tautologies in languageΦ, our
logical system contains the following axioms:
1. Truth: Nϕ→ ϕ and BsCϕ→ ϕ,
2. Distributivity: N(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Nϕ→ Nψ),
3. Negative Introspection: ¬Nϕ→ N¬Nϕ,
4. None to Blame: ¬Bs
∅
ϕ,
5. Monotonicity: BsCϕ→ B
t
Dϕ, where C ⊆ D and s ≤ t,
6. Joint Responsibility: if C ∩D = ∅, then
NBsCϕ ∧ NB
t
Dψ → (ϕ ∨ ψ → B
s+t
C∪D(ϕ ∨ ψ)),
7. Blame for Cause:
N(ϕ→ ψ)→ (BsCψ → (ϕ→ B
s
Cϕ)),
8. Fairness: BsCϕ→ N(ϕ→ B
s
Cϕ).
These axioms are the same as the axioms of the logic of
blameworthiness [Naumov and Tao, 2019] except for the sac-
rifice superscript being added. The Truth, the Distributivity,
and the Negative Introspection axioms for modality N cap-
ture the fact that this is an S5-modality. The Truth axiom
for modality B states that a coalition can only be blamed for
something which is true. The None to Blame axiom says that
the empty coalition can not be blamed for anything.
The Monotonicity axiom states that if a smaller coalition
C can be blamed for not preventing an outcome at cost at
most s, then any larger coalition D can also be blamed for
not preventing the outcome at cost at most t, where t ≥ s.
This axiom is valid because each agent in setD \C could use
the zero-cost action. One may question our underlying as-
sumption that a larger coalition should be blamed for wrong-
doings of its part. This assumption is consistent, for example,
with how the entire millennial generation is blamed in the
media for decline in sales of beer, paper napkins, and motor-
cycles [Scipioni, 2018].
The Joint Responsibility axiom shows how blames of two
disjoint coalitions can be combined into a blame of their
union. It resembles the Cooperation axiom for resource-
bounded coalitions [Alechina et al., 2011]: if C ∩ D = ∅,
then S
p
C(ϕ→ ψ)→ (S
q
Dϕ→ S
p+q
C∪Dψ).
To understand the Blame for Cause axiom note that for-
mula N(ϕ→ ψ) means that ϕ implies ψ for each play of the
game. In this case we say that ϕ is a cause of ψ. The axiom
says that if a coalition is responsible for a statement, then it is
also responsible for its cause as long as the cause is true.
The Fairness axiom states that if a coalition is blamed for
ϕ, then it should be blamed for ϕ each time when ϕ is true.
We write ⊢ ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the axioms
of our system using the Modus Ponens and the Necessitation
inference rules:
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
,
ϕ
Nϕ
.
The next lemma generalizes the Joint Responsibility axiom
from two to multiple coalitions. Its proof is identical to the
proof of the corresponding result in [Naumov and Tao, 2019,
Lemma 5] with the superscript added.
Lemma 1 For any integer n ≥ 0,
{NBtiDiχi}
n
i=1, χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn ⊢ B
t1+···+tn
D1∪···∪Dn
(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn),
where sets D1, . . . , Dn are pairwise disjoint. ⊠
The following two lemmas capture well-know properties
of S5 modality. Their proofs, for example, could be found
in [Naumov and Tao, 2018].
Lemma 2 If ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢ ψ, then Nϕ1, . . . ,Nϕn ⊢ Nψ. ⊠
Lemma 3 (Positive Introspection) ⊢ Nϕ→ NNϕ. ⊠
We conclude this section with an example of a formal proof
in our logical system. This example will be used later in the
proof of the completeness.
Lemma 4 For any integer n ≥ 0 and any disjoint sets
D1, . . . , Dn ⊆ C if t1 + · · ·+ tn ≤ s, then
{NBtiDiχi}
n
i=1,N(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn) ⊢ N(ϕ→ B
s
Cϕ).
Proof. By Lemma 1,
{NBtiDiχi}
n
i=1, χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn ⊢ B
t1+···+tn
D1∪···∪Dn
(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn).
Hence, by the Monotonicity axiom,
{NBtiDiχi}
n
i=1, χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn ⊢ B
s
C(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn).
Then, by the Modus Ponens inference rule,
{NBtiDiχi}
n
i=1, ϕ, ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn ⊢ B
s
C(χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn).
Hence, by the Truth axiom and the Modus Ponens rule,
{NBtiDiχi}
n
i=1, ϕ,N(ϕ→ χ1∨· · ·∨χn) ⊢ B
s
C(χ1∨· · ·∨χn).
At the same time,
N(ϕ→ χ1∨· · ·∨χn)→ (B
s
C(χ1∨· · ·∨χn)→ (ϕ→ B
s
Cϕ))
is an instance of the Blame for Cause axiom. Thus, by the
Modus Ponens inference rule applied twice,
{NBtiDiχi}
n
i=1, ϕ,N(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn) ⊢ ϕ→ B
s
Cϕ.
Then, by the Modus Ponens inference rule,
{NBtiDiχi}
n
i=1, ϕ,N(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn) ⊢ B
s
Cϕ.
Hence, by the deduction lemma,
{NBtiDiχi}
n
i=1,N(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn) ⊢ ϕ→ B
s
Cϕ.
Thus, by Lemma 2,
{NNBtiDiχi}
n
i=1,NN(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn) ⊢ N(ϕ→ B
s
Cϕ).
Then, by the definition of modalityN, the Negative Introspec-
tion axiom, and the Modus Ponens inference rule,
{NBtiDiχi}
n
i=1,NN(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn) ⊢ N(ϕ→ B
s
Cϕ).
Therefore, by Lemma 3 and the Modus Ponens inference
rule, the statement of the lemma is true. ⊠
4 Soundness
In this section we prove soundness of our logical system.
The soundness of S5 axioms (the Truth, the Distributivity,
and the Negative Introspection) for modality N is straightfor-
ward. Below we prove the soundness of the remaining ax-
ioms for any arbitrary play (δ, ω) ∈ P of an arbitrary game
(∆, ‖ · ‖, d0,Ω, P, pi).
Lemma 5 (δ, ω) 1 Bs
∅
ϕ, for all s ≥ 0.
Proof. Suppose that (δ, ω)  Bs
∅
ϕ. Thus, by Definition 4,
(δ, ω)  ϕ and there is γ ∈ ∆C such that ‖γ‖ ≤ s and for
each play (δ′, ω′), if γ =∅ δ
′, then (δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ. Consider
play (δ, ω) and note that statement γ =∅ δ is vacuously true.
Thus, (δ, ω) 1 ϕ, which is a contradiction. ⊠
Lemma 6 For all sets C,D ⊆ A and all s, t ≥ 0, if C ⊆ D,
s ≤ t, and (δ, ω)  BsCϕ, then (δ, ω)  B
t
Dϕ.
Proof. By Definition 4, assumption (δ, ω)  BsCϕ implies
that (i) (δ, ω)  ϕ and (ii) there is γ ∈ ∆C such that ‖γ‖ ≤ s
and for each play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P , if γ =C δ
′, then (δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ.
Define action profile γ′ ∈ ∆D as follows:
γ′(a) =
{
γ(a), if a ∈ C
d0, otherwise.
Because d0 is a zero-cost action, ‖γ
′‖ = ‖γ‖ = s ≤ t by
Definition 3 and the assumption s ≤ t. Consider any play
(δ′, ω′) ∈ P such that γ′ =D δ
′. By Definition 4 and because
(δ, ω)  ϕ, it suffices to show that (δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ. Indeed,
γ =C γ
′ =C δ
′. Therefore, (δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ by the choice of
action profile γ. ⊠
Lemma 7 For all C,D ⊆ A and all s, t ≥ 0, if C ∩D = ∅,
(δ, ω)  NBsCϕ, (δ, ω)  NB
t
Dψ, and (δ, ω)  ϕ ∨ ψ, then
(δ, ω)  Bs+tC∪D(ϕ ∨ ψ).
Proof. By Definition 4 and the definition of modality N,
assumption (δ, ω)  NBsCϕ implies that there is a play
(δ′, ω′) ∈ P such that (δ′, ω′)  BsCϕ. Thus, by Defini-
tion 4, there is an action profile γ1 ∈ ∆
C such that ‖γ1‖ ≤ s
and
∀δ′′∀ω′′((δ′′, ω′′) ∈ P ∧ γ1 =C δ
′′ → (δ′′, ω′′) 1 ϕ). (1)
Similarly, assumption (δ, ω)  NBtDψ implies that there is an
action profile γ2 ∈ ∆
D such that ‖γ2‖ ≤ t and
∀δ′′∀ω′′((δ′′, ω′′) ∈ P ∧ γ2 =C δ
′′ → (δ′′, ω′′) 1 ψ). (2)
Consider action profile γ ∈ ∆C∪D such that
γ(a) =
{
γ1(a), if a ∈ C,
γ2(a), if a ∈ D.
(3)
Action profile γ is well-defined because C ∩ D = ∅ by the
assumption of the lemma. Note that ‖γ‖ = ‖γ1‖ + ‖γ2‖ by
Definition 3 and inequalities ‖γ1‖ ≤ s and ‖γ2‖ ≤ t.
Then, by Definition 4 and the assumption (δ, ω)  ϕ∨ψ, it
suffices to show that for each play (δ′′′, ω′′′), if γ =C∪D δ
′′′,
then (δ′′′, ω′′′) 1 ϕ ∨ ψ. Indeed, equality γ =C∪D δ′′′
implies γ =C δ
′′′. Thus, γ1 =C δ
′′′ by equation (3). Hence,
(δ′′′, ω′′′) 1 ϕ by statement (1). Similarly, (δ′′′, ω′′′) 1 ψ by
statement (2). Then, (δ′′′, ω′′′) 1 ϕ ∨ ψ, by Definition 4. ⊠
Lemma 8 If (δ, ω)  N(ϕ → ψ), (δ, ω)  BsCψ, and
(δ, ω)  ϕ, then (δ, ω)  BsCϕ.
Proof. By Definition 4, assumption (δ, ω)  BsCψ implies
that there is an action profile γ ∈ ∆C such that ‖γ‖ ≤ s and
for each play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P , if γ =C δ
′, then (δ′, ω′) 1 ψ.
Thus, by Definition 4 and assumption (δ, ω)  N(ϕ→ ψ),
for each play (δ′, ω′), if γ =C δ
′, then (δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ.
Therefore, assumption (δ, ω)  ϕ implies that (δ, ω)  BsCϕ
again by Definition 4. ⊠
Lemma 9 If (δ, ω)  BsCϕ, then (δ, ω)  N(ϕ→ B
s
Cϕ).
Proof. Suppose that (δ, ω) 1 N(ϕ → BsCϕ). Thus,
by Definition 4, there is a play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P , such that
(δ′, ω′) 1 ϕ→ BsCϕ. Then, (δ
′, ω′)  ϕ and (δ′, ω′) 1 BsCϕ
by Definition 4. Hence, again by Definition 4, for each ac-
tion profile γ ∈ ∆C such that ‖γ‖ ≤ s, there is a play
(δ′′, ω′′) ∈ P , such that γ =C δ
′′ and (δ′′, ω′′) 1 ϕ.
Therefore, (δ, ω)  BsCϕ by Definition 4. ⊠
5 Completeness
We start the proof of the completeness by defining the canon-
ical game G(ω0) = (∆, ‖ · ‖, d0,Ω, P, pi) for each maximal
consistent set of formulae ω0.
Definition 5 Set ∆ consists of a zero-cost action d0 and
all triples (ϕ,C, s) such that ϕ ∈ Φ is a formula, C is a
nonempty coalition, and s is a non-negative real number.
Informally, we consider actions as “votes” of agents. Zero-
cost action d0 could be interpreted as abstaining from vot-
ing. Action (ϕ,C, s) by an agent a means that agent a is
voting as a part of coalition C to prevent ϕ at the total cost
s to the whole coalition. If agent a votes (ϕ,C, s), then
statement ϕ is not necessarily false in the outcome. The
vote aggregation mechanism is given in Definition 8. Def-
inition 5 is substantially different from a similar definition
in [Naumov and Tao, 2019], where each action consists of
just a single formula ϕ.
Definition 6 For each action d ∈ ∆, let ‖d‖ = 0 if d = d0
and ‖d‖ =
s
|C|
if d = (ϕ,C, s).
Informally, ‖d‖ = s|C| means that the cost of each joint
action is divided evenly between all members of the coalition.
Note that size |C| of coalition C is non-zero by Definition 5.
Definition 7 The set of outcomes Ω is the set of all maximal
consistent sets of formulae ω such that for each formula ϕ if
Nϕ ∈ ω0, then ϕ ∈ ω.
Definition 8 The set P ⊆ ∆A×Ω consists of all pairs (δ, ω)
such that for any formula NBsCψ ∈ ω0, if δ(a) = (ψ,C, s)
for each agent a ∈ C, then ¬ψ ∈ ω.
In other words, for each formula NBsCψ ∈ ω0, if each mem-
ber of coalition C votes as a part of C to prevent ϕ at cost s,
then ϕ is guaranteed to be false in the outcome.
Definition 9 pi(p) = {(δ, ω) ∈ P | p ∈ ω}.
As usual, the key part of the proof of the completeness
is the induction, or “truth”, lemma. In our case this is
Lemma 13. The next three lemmas are auxiliary lemmas used
in the proof of Lemma 13.
Lemma 10 For any play (δ, ω) ∈ P , any profile γ ∈ ∆C ,
and any formula ¬(ϕ→ BsCϕ) ∈ ω, if ‖γ‖ ≤ s, then there is
a play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P such that γ =C δ
′ and ϕ ∈ ω′.
Proof. Consider the following set X of formulae:
{ϕ} ∪ {ψ | Nψ ∈ ω0}
∪ {¬χ | NBtDχ ∈ ω0, D ⊆ C, ∀a ∈ D(γ(a) = (χ,D, t))}.
Claim 1 SetX is consistent.
PROOF OF CLAIM. Suppose the opposite. Thus, there are
formulae
Nψ1, . . . ,Nψm ∈ ω0, (4)
NBt1D1χ1, . . . ,NB
tn
Dn
χn ∈ ω0, (5)
such that
D1, . . . , Dn ⊆ C, (6)
γ(a) = (χi, Di, ti) for all a ∈ Di, i ≤ n, (7)
ψ1, . . . , ψm,¬χ1, . . . ,¬χn ⊢ ¬ϕ. (8)
Without loss of generality, we can assume that formulae
χ1, . . . , χn are distinct. Thus, assumption (7) implies that
setsD1, . . . , Dn are pairwise disjoint. Hence, by Definition 6
and formula (7),
‖γ‖ =
∑
a∈C
‖γ(a)‖ ≥
∑
a∈D1
‖γ(a)‖+ · · ·+
∑
a∈Dn
‖γ(a)‖
=
∑
a∈D1
‖(χ1, D1, t1)‖ + · · ·+
∑
a∈Dn
‖(χn, Dn, tn)‖
=
∑
a∈D1
t1
|D1|
+ · · ·+
∑
a∈Dn
tn
|Dn|
= t1 + · · ·+ tn.
Thus, by to the assumption ‖γ‖ ≤ s of the lemma,
t1 + · · ·+ tn ≤ s. (9)
At the same tine, assumption (8) by the laws of proposi-
tional reasoning implies that
ψ1, . . . , ψm ⊢ ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn.
Thus,Nψ1, . . . ,Nψm ⊢ N(ϕ→ χ1∨· · ·∨χn). by Lemma 2,
Hence, ω0 ⊢ N(ϕ→ χ1 ∨ · · · ∨ χn by assumption (4). Thus,
by Lemma 4, using assumption (5), statement (9), and the fact
that sets D1, . . . , Dn ⊆ C are pairwise disjoint,
ω0 ⊢ N(ϕ→ B
s
Cϕ).
Hence,N(ϕ→ BsCϕ) ∈ ω0 because set ω0 is maximal. Then,
ϕ → BsCϕ ∈ ω by Definition 7. Thus, ¬(ϕ → B
s
Cϕ) /∈ ω
because set ω is consistent, which contradicts assumption
¬(ϕ → BsCϕ) ∈ ω of the lemma. Therefore, set X is
consistent. ⊠
Let ω′ be any maximal consistent extension of setX . Thus,
ϕ ∈ X ⊆ ω′ by the choice of sets X and ω′. Also, ω′ ∈ Ω
by Definition 7 and the choice of sets X and ω′.
Let the complete action profile δ′ be defined as follows:
δ′(a) =
{
s(a), if a ∈ C,
d0, otherwise.
(10)
Then, s =C δ
′.
Claim 2 (δ′, ω′) ∈ P .
PROOF OF CLAIM. Consider any formula NBtDχ ∈ ω0 such
that δ′(a) = (χ,D, t) for each a ∈ D. By Definition 8, it
suffices to show that ¬χ ∈ ω′.
Case I: D ⊆ C. Thus, ¬χ ∈ X by the definition of set X .
Therefore, ¬χ ∈ ω′ by the choice of set ω′.
Case II:D * C. Consider any a ∈ D \C. Thus, δ′(a) = d0
by equation (10). At the same time, δ′(a) = (χ,D, t)
because a ∈ D. Therefore, d0 = (χ,D, t), which is a
contradiction. ⊠
This concludes the proof of the lemma. ⊠
Lemma 11 For each outcome ω ∈ Ω, there is a complete
action profile δ ∈ ∆A such that (δ, ω) ∈ P .
Proof. Consider a complete action profile δ where δ(a) = d0
for all a ∈ A. To show (δ, ω) ∈ P , consider any such formula
NBtDχ ∈ ω0 that δ(a) = (χ,D, t) for all a ∈ D. Due to
Definition 8, it enough to prove that ¬(χ,D, t) ∈ ω.
Case I: D = ∅. Hence, ⊢ ¬BtDχ by the None to Blame ax-
iom. Then, ⊢ N¬BtDχ by the Necessitation inference rule.
Thus, ¬N¬BtDχ /∈ ω0 by the consistency of the set ω0.
Therefore, NBtDχ /∈ ω0 due to the definition of the modal-
ity N, which contradicts to the assumption NBtDχ ∈ ω0.
Case II: D 6= ∅. Hence, set D contains at least one agent a.
Then, (χ,D, t) = δ(a) = d0 by the definition of profile δ.
Thus, d0 = (χ,D, t), which is a contradiction. ⊠
Lemma 12 For each play (δ, ω) ∈ P and each formula
¬Nϕ ∈ ω, there is a play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P such that ¬ϕ ∈ ω′.
Proof. Let X be the set {¬ϕ} ∪ {ψ | Nψ ∈ ω0}.
Next, we prove the consistency of set X . Assume the op-
posite. Hence, there are formulae Nψ1, . . . ,Nψn ∈ ω0
where ψ1, . . . , ψn ⊢ ϕ. Thus, Nψ1, . . . ,Nψn ⊢ Nϕ due to
Lemma 2. Then, ω0 ⊢ Nϕ because Nψ1, . . . ,Nψn ∈ ω0.
Thus, ω0 ⊢ NNϕ by Lemma 3. Hence, it follows from as-
sumption ω ∈ Ω and Definition 7 that Nϕ ∈ ω. Thus, by
the consistency of set ω ¬Nϕ /∈ ω, which contradicts the as-
sumption of the lemma. Therefore, set X is consistent.
Consider any maximal consistent extension ω′ of set
X . Observe that ¬ϕ ∈ X ⊆ ω′ due to the definition of
set X . Finally, by Lemma 11, there is a profile δ′ where
(δ′, ω′) ∈ P . ⊠
Lemma 13 (δ, ω)  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ ω for any play (δ, ω) ∈ P and
any formula ϕ ∈ Φ.
Proof. The lemma will be shown by induction on structural
complexity of formula ϕ. If ϕ is a propositional variable,
then the statement of the lemma follows from Definition 4
and Definition 9. The cases when ϕ is a negation or an impli-
cation, as usual, can be proven from the maximality and the
consistency of set ω.
Let formula ϕ have the form Nψ.
(⇒) : Suppose Nψ /∈ ω. Then, ¬Nψ ∈ ω by the maximality
of set ω. Thus, there is a play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P such that ¬ψ ∈ ω′,
by Lemma 12. Hence, ψ /∈ ω′ because set ω′ is consistent.
Then, by the induction hypothesis, (δ′, ω′) 1 ψ. Therefore,
(δ, ω) 1 Nψ by Definition 4.
(⇐) : Suppose Nψ ∈ ω. Then, ¬Nψ /∈ ω because set ω
is consistent. Thus, N¬Nψ /∈ ω0 by Definition 7. Hence,
ω0 0 N¬Nψ due to the maximality of set ω0. Then, by the
Negative Introspection axiom, ω0 0 ¬Nψ. Thus, Nψ ∈ ω0
by the maximality of set ω0. Hence, ψ ∈ ω
′ for each outcome
ω′ ∈ Ω by Definition 7. Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
(δ′, ω′)  ψ for all plays (δ′, ω′) ∈ P . Then, (δ, ω)  Nψ by
Definition 4.
Let formula ϕ have the form BsCψ.
(⇒) : Suppose that BsCψ /∈ ω.
Case I: ψ /∈ ω. Thus, (δ, ω) 1 ψ by the induction hypothesis.
Therefore, (δ, ω) 1 BsCψ by Definition 4.
Case II: ψ ∈ ω. First we prove that ψ → BsCψ /∈ ω. Suppose
ψ → BsCψ ∈ ω. Thus, ω ⊢ B
s
Cψ by the Modus Ponens
inference rule. Hence, by the maximality of set ω, we have
BsCψ ∈ ω, which contradicts the assumption B
s
Cψ /∈ ω.
Since ω is a maximal set, statementψ → BsCψ /∈ ω implies
that ¬(ψ → BsCψ) ∈ ω. Hence, by Lemma 10, for any action
profile γ ∈ ∆C , if ‖γ‖ ≤ s, then there is a play (δ′, ω′)where
γ =C δ
′ and ψ ∈ ω′. Thus, by the induction hypothesis,
for each profile γ ∈ ∆C , if ‖γ‖ ≤ s, then there is a play
(δ′, ω′) ∈ P such that γ =C δ
′ and (δ′, ω′)  ψ. Therefore,
(δ, ω) 1 BsCψ by Definition 4.
(⇐) : Suppose that BsCψ ∈ ω. Hence, ω ⊢ ψ by the Truth
axiom. Then, ψ ∈ ω by the maximality of the set ω. Thus,
(δ, ω)  ψ by the induction hypothesis.
Define γ ∈ ∆C to be an action profile such that γ(a) =
(ψ,C, s) for each agent a ∈ C.
Claim 3 ‖γ‖ ≤ s.
PROOF OF CLAIM. If set C is not empty, then, by Defini-
tion 3 and Definition 6,
‖γ‖ =
∑
a∈C
‖(ψ,C, s)‖ =
∑
a∈C
s
|C|
= s.
If set C is empty, then ‖γ‖ = 0 by Definition 3. At the
same time, s ≥ 0 by Definition 1. Therefore, ‖γ‖ ≤ s. ⊠
Consider any play (δ′, ω′) ∈ P such that γ =C δ
′. By
Definition 4 and Claim 3, it suffices to show that (δ′, ω′) 1 ψ.
Statement BsCψ ∈ ω implies that ¬B
s
Cψ /∈ ω because
set ω is consistent. Thus, N¬BsCψ /∈ ω0 by Definition 7
and because ω ∈ Ω. Hence, ¬N¬BsCψ ∈ ω0 due to the
maximality of the set ω0. Thus, NB
s
Cψ ∈ ω0 by the definition
of modality N. Also, δ′(a) = γ(a) = (ψ,C, s) for each
a ∈ C. Hence, ¬ψ ∈ ω′ by Definition 8 and the assumption
(δ′, ω′) ∈ P . Then, ψ /∈ ω′ by the consistency of set ω′.
Therefore, (δ′, ω′) 1 ψ by the induction hypothesis. ⊠
Finally, we are prepared to state and prove the strong com-
pleteness of our logical system.
Theorem 1 If X 0 ϕ, then there is a game and a play (δ, ω)
of the game where (δ, ω)  χ for all χ ∈ X and (δ, ω) 1 ϕ.
Proof. Assume that X 0 ϕ. Hence, set X ∪ {¬ϕ} is con-
sistent. Choose ω0 to be any maximal consistent extension of
set X ∪ {¬ϕ} and G(ω0) = (∆, ‖ · ‖, d0,Ω, P, pi) to be the
canonical game defined above. Then, ω0 ∈ Ω by Definition 7
and the Truth axiom.
By Lemma 11, there exists an action profile δ ∈ ∆A
such that (δ, ω0) ∈ P . Hence, (δ, ω0)  χ for all χ ∈ X
and (δ, ω0)  ¬ϕ by Lemma 13 and the choice of set ω0.
Therefore, (δ, ω0) 1 ϕ by Definition 4. ⊠
6 Conclusion
In this paper we combine the ideas from the logics of resource
bounded coalitions [Alechina et al., 2011] and blameworthi-
ness [Naumov and Tao, 2019] into a logical system that cap-
tures the properties of a degree of blameworthiness. Fol-
lowing [Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner, 2018], the degree of
blameworthiness is defined as the cost of sacrifice. The main
technical result is the completeness theorem for our system.
References
[A˚gotnes et al., 2009] Thomas A˚gotnes, Wiebe van der
Hoek, and Michael Wooldridge. Reasoning about coali-
tional games. Artificial Intelligence, 173(1):45 – 79, 2009.
[A˚gotnes et al., 2010] Thomas A˚gotnes, Philippe Balbiani,
Hans van Ditmarsch, and Pablo Seban. Group announce-
ment logic. Journal of Applied Logic, 8(1):62 – 81, 2010.
[Alechina et al., 2011] Natasha Alechina, Brian Logan,
Hoang Nga Nguyen, and Abdur Rakib. Logic for coali-
tions with bounded resources. Journal of Logic and Com-
putation, 21(6):907–937, December 2011.
[BBC, 2017] BBC. Do you have to rescue some-
one in danger? BBC News, July 21, 2017.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40680895.
[Belardinelli, 2014] Francesco Belardinelli. Reasoning
about knowledge and strategies: Epistemic strategy logic.
In Proceedings 2nd International Workshop on Strategic
Reasoning, SR 2014, Grenoble, France, April 5-6, 2014,
volume 146 of EPTCS, pages 27–33, 2014.
[Borgo, 2007] Stefano Borgo. Coalitions in action logic. In
20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence, pages 1822–1827, 2007.
[Bristow, 2011] Michael Bristow. Chinese province debates
law after hit-and-run outcry. BBC News, October 20, 2011.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-15382273.
[Broersen et al., 2009] Jan Broersen, Andreas Herzig, and
Nicolas Troquard. What groups do, can do, and know they
can do: an analysis in normal modal logics. Journal of
Applied Non-Classical Logics, 19(3):261–289, 2009.
[Cushman, 2015] Fiery Cushman. Deconstructing intent to
reconstruct morality. Current Opinion in Psychology,
6:97–103, 2015.
[Frankfurt, 1969] Harry G Frankfurt. Alternate possibili-
ties and moral responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy,
66(23):829–839, 1969.
[Goranko and Enqvist, 2018] Valentin Goranko and Sebas-
tian Enqvist. Socially friendly and group protecting coali-
tion logics. In Proceedings of the 17th International Con-
ference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
pages 372–380. International Foundation for Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2018.
[Goranko et al., 2013] Valentin Goranko, Wojciech Jam-
roga, and Paolo Turrini. Strategic games and truly playable
effectivity functions. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems, 26(2):288–314,Mar 2013.
[Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner, 2018] Joseph Y Halpern and
Max Kleiman-Weiner. Towards formal definitions of
blameworthiness, intention, and moral responsibility. In
Proceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Ar-
tificial Intelligence (AAAI-18), 2018.
[Halpern, 2016] Joseph Y Halpern. Actual causality. MIT
Press, 2016.
[Johnson, 2017] Ian Johnson. In china, video
of deadly accident reignites debate over lack
of trust. New York Times, June 9, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/09/world/asia/china-
woman-run-over-video.html.
[Kagan, 1991] Shelly Kagan. The Limits of Morality. Oxford
Ethics Series. Clarendon Press, 1991.
[Lorini and Schwarzentruber, 2011] Emiliano Lorini and
Franc¸ois Schwarzentruber. A logic for reasoning
about counterfactual emotions. Artificial Intelligence,
175(3):814, 2011.
[Naumov and Tao, 2018] Pavel Naumov and Jia Tao.
Second-order know-how strategies. In Proceedings of the
2018 International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 390–398, 2018.
[Naumov and Tao, 2019] Pavel Naumov and Jia Tao. Blame-
worthiness in strategic games. In Proceedings of Thirty-
third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-
19), 2019.
[Nelkin, 2016] Dana Kay Nelkin. Difficulty and degrees
of moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. Nouˆs,
50(2):356–378, 2016.
[Pauly, 2002] Marc Pauly. A modal logic for coalitional
power in games. Journal of Logic and Computation,
12(1):149–166, 2002.
[Sauro et al., 2006] Luigi Sauro, Jelle Gerbrandy, Wiebe
van der Hoek, and Michael Wooldridge. Reasoning about
action and cooperation. In Proceedings of the Fifth In-
ternational Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems, AAMAS ’06, pages 185–192, New
York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[Scipioni, 2018] Jade Scipioni. Millennials blamed for
killing these businesses. Fox News, December 4,
2018. https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/millennials-
blamed-for-killing-these-businesses.
[Shinan, 2011] Liu Shinan. Need to protect our
good samaritans. China Daily, January 5, 2011.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-01/05/
content 11794724.htm.
[van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2005] Wiebe van der Hoek
and Michael Wooldridge. On the logic of cooperation and
propositional control. Artificial Intelligence, 164(1):81 –
119, 2005.
[Widerker, 2017] David Widerker. Moral responsibility and
alternative possibilities: Essays on the importance of al-
ternative possibilities. Routledge, 2017.
[Xu, 1998] Ming Xu. Axioms for deliberative stit. Journal
of Philosophical Logic, 27(5):505–552, 1998.
[周松 et al., 2011] 周松, 钟传芳, and 许琛. 两车先后碾
压2岁女童，10余人见死不救. 羊城晚报, October 16,
2011. https://news.qq.com/a/20111016/000459.htm.
[熊浩然, 2017] 熊浩然. 驻马店警方通报,女子遭二
次碾压无人施救. 华西都市报, June 7, 2017.
http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170607/51209660 0.shtml.
